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I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose you, in a criminal proceeding, successfully
excluded evidence obtained in a search of a car in which you
were a passenger. At the district court level, the government
made no argument to suggest you lacked a personal,
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. You beat
the odds. But at the appellate court, the government posits
that you, as a mere passenger, lack proper standing to assert
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car and may not
exclude the evidence. Didn’t the government waive the
standing challenge when it failed to assert it at the district
court level? What if the government failed to mention it in a
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brief on appeal? Depending on your circuit, the answer
varies.
The Fourth Amendment, at its core, prohibits
unreasonable government searches and seizures.2 That
right is an individual, personally held right.3 In essence, a
third party may not assert the reasonable expectation of
privacy of another.4 A defendant seeking to suppress seized
evidence must demonstrate a violation to her reasonable
expectation of privacy in the place or thing searched.5 This
is known as “standing” in Fourth Amendment search and
seizure jurisprudence.6 This “standing” is a substantive
element of a Fourth Amendment claim, not “standing” as
understood in jurisdictional or Article III contexts.7 This is
the standing contemplated in the scenario above.
At the same time, the right, through the exclusionary
rule, also protects the collective.8 The exclusionary rule gives
force to the Fourth Amendment. Evidence obtained through
an illegal governmental search and seizure may be
suppressed from use at trial.9 The exclusionary rule
functions to regulate the behavior of governmental actors
and, in doing so, protects the rights of those who may be
targets of future governmental intrusions.10 The protection
comes in the form of bright-line rules of what is and is not

Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989, 995 (2021).
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (“Fourth
Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other
constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.”).
4 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978). See also Brown v.
United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230 (1973); Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
492 (1963).
5 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140.
6 Id. at 133.
7 Id. Though the Court reiterates reluctance to call this tenant
“standing” because of the risk of confusion, several opinions
continue to use the term. For the sake of clarity I will use the term
“standing” in this note.
8 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 367 (1974).
9 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
10 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
2
3
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permissible police action.11 All that said, where the
exclusionary rule acts to protect Fourth Amendment rights
by rendering evidence inadmissible, the standing
requirement limits the effectiveness as well as the regulatory
nature of the exclusionary rule.12 In essence, the standing
requirement limits the number of individuals who may use
the exclusionary rule.13
But what happens when the government fails to
challenge a party’s standing to move to suppress evidence?
Did the government concede—forever abandon the right to
challenge—the issue of standing by failing to address it at
the district court level? May the government challenge a
defendant’s standing for the first time on appeal? The
rationales of the exclusionary rule and standing seem to
conflict with respect to this question of waiver. Should the
court acknowledge the waiver and thereby extend the
exclusionary rule to a defendant, regulate police and
prosecutor behavior, and protect the collective? Or should
the government be permitted to challenge a defendant’s
standing on appeal, and thereby allow standing to function
as a greater check on the exclusionary rule by ensuring only
those personally aggrieved exercise the right?
While the Supreme Court of the United States
continues to confront and resolve many questions about the
Fourth Amendment and searches,14 the Court has yet to
Andrew McLetchie, The Case for Bright-Line Rules in Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence: Adopting the Tenth Circuit’s BrightLine Test for Determining the Voluntariness of Consent, 30 Hofstra
L. Rev. 225, 230 (2001) (“The exclusionary rule is the seminal
bright-line rule in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence . . .”).
12 Sherry F. Colb, Standing Room Only: Why Fourth Amendment
Exclusion and Standing Can No Longer Logically Coexist, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1663, 1702-03 (Feb. 2007) (“[I]t is suppression and not violation of the Fourth Amendment itself - that is at issue
when a court grants or denies a criminal defendant standing to
suppress the products of a Fourth Amendment violation.”).
13 Id. at n. 1.
14 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (holding
a warrantless search and seizure of cellular phone records violates
the Fourth Amendment). See also Byrd v. United States, 138 S.
Ct. 1518 (2018) (holding a driver of a rental car with permission to
operate the vehicle but not on the rental agreement has a
11
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directly address questions surrounding the government’s
failure to challenge standing at the district court level,
leaving inconsistent results across the circuits.
A minority of circuits allow an objection to standing
at any time, including on appeal.15 Many circuits, however,
consider the objection waived on appeal if not initially
brought up in the lower court, never to be raised again.16 This
fully extinguishes the argument.17 Simply put, the issue may
never be argued, initially, on appeal. By contrast, two
circuits, the Sixth and Ninth, are “waive-friendly” in that
they do permit an initial objection on appeal in some
scenarios. The approaches differ on when the circuits
consider the issue waived.18
At the heart of the split seems to be a question of the
importance of standing. The decisions reflect the ongoing
tension between champions of a broad exclusionary rule and
those who would seek to limit its effects through standing.
The nine circuits considering whether the government may
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle); Lange v.
California, 141 S. Ct. 617 (2021) (finding exigent circumstances
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is not
categorically triggered when police are pursuing a suspect whom
they believe committed a misdemeanor); Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S
Ct. 1596 (2021) (holding the community caretaking function
exception to the warrant requirement does not extend to the home).
15 United States v. Bouffard, 917 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1990); see also
United States v. Rodriguez-Arreola, 270 F.3d 611, 616 (8th Cir.
2001).
16 United States v. Golson, 743 F.3d 44 (3d Cir. 2014); United
States v. Gonzales, 79 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Price, 54 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Dewitt, 946 F.2d
1497 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Lightbourn, 357 F. App’x
259 (11th Cir. 2009).
17 United States v. Navedo, 694 F.3d 463, 478 n.3 (3d Cir. 2012)
(“[W]hether [defendant] possessed a reasonable expectation of
privacy—a necessary predicate to his invocation of the
exclusionary rule—might have presented a close question in this
case. But the Government waived this standing argument by
failing to raise it in the District Court.”) (internal citations
omitted) (brackets added).
18 See, e.g., United States v. Noble, 762 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2014);
see also United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 670 (9th Cir.
1991).
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waive the right to challenge standing on appeal root their
decisions in both logic and law. But each court seems to
arrive at a different conclusion in a different manner. The
decisions provide each circuit and judge at the appellate level
an opportunity to weigh in on the value and importance of
standing in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
By
extension, the decisions determine the pool of individuals
who may benefit from evidence exclusion.
Essentially, a court’s decision on whether the
government may waive standing tips the scale in favor of
either the exclusionary rule or standing. The question posed
becomes: should the exclusionary rule receive broad
application, or should it be limited by a standing
requirement? If it should be limited by standing, should the
issue of waiver at the appellate level function to limit the
chilling effects of standing? Effectively, the appellate
decisions determine the pool of individuals who may benefit
from evidence exclusion. Still, the decisions do not explicitly
address the role standing should play in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.
Part II of this comment will explore the history of the
Fourth Amendment, the purpose of the exclusionary rule,
and the justification for standing. Part III will analyze the
four approaches taken by the varying circuits. Finally, Part
IV will scrutinize these approaches against the rationales
underlying the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule,
and the standing requirement, and examine the role waiver
should play in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Given the
importance of the exclusionary rule in enforcing
Constitutional rights, a unified approach is necessary. To
promote best practices and guard against stealthy
government encroachment on Constitutional rights, when
the government fails to challenge a defendant’s standing at
the district court level, an appellate court should disallow a
challenge to standing in the brief or at oral arguments.

II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
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affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and persons or things to be seized.”19

A. FIRST, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT.
Privacy and security in persons and property have
long been highly favored by citizens of the United States.20
The Fourth Amendment, drafted into the Bill of Rights,
ratified by the states in 1791, haled from the American
people’s desire to safeguard against unreasonable searches
and seizures, such as were permitted under general
warrants issued under the authority of the English
government.21 Under these general warrants, invasions of
the home and privacy of the citizens and the seizure of their
private papers in support of any charge made against them
were commonplace and legal.22 American colonies also
suffered writs of assistance which sanctioned warrants and
seizures, often without criminal accusations.23 Indeed, the
general writs and writs of assistance were often issued
without specification of the place to be searched and the
items to be seized.24 Eventually, the people demanded

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment,
98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 561 (Dec. 1999) (describing how
Constitutional scholar Nelson B. Lasson “rooted the Framers'
motivation for constitutional search and seizure provisions in
three episodes of controversy in search and arrest authority that
preceded the American Revolution”).
21 1 HON. WILLIAM H. ERICKSON & B.J. GEORGE JR .,UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT CASES AND COMMENTS P 1.01 (2021).
22 Id.; see also Davies, supra note 20 at 551.
23 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (“The practice
had obtained in the colonies of issuing writs of assistance to the
revenue officers, empowering them, in their discretion, to search
suspected places for smuggled goods, which James Otis
pronounced ‘the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most
destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of
law, that ever was found in an English law book.’”).
24 Id. at 625-626.
19
20

STILL STANDING

79

protection against such abuse of government power.25 The
Fourth Amendment represented resistance to these
practices of general warrants and writs of assistance, drafted
to ensure a man’s home was, in fact, his castle.26
While Supreme Court jurisprudence since the 1960s
evidences that the Fourth Amendment is a critical
amendment in the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court largely
ignored the amendment until 1886.27 In Boyd v. United
States, the first case of significance for Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court examined the history of the Fourth
Amendment.28 Then, for the first time, the Court held a law
unconstitutional for violating the Fourth Amendment.29
Boyd involved not a criminal prosecution but a civil action by
the United States for the forfeiture of goods imported in
violation of customs revenue laws.30 The Court held that
while there was no physical trespass, nor were there private
papers at issue, compulsion to produce records in a civil
matter functioned as an illegal search or seizure of private
papers, used to launch criminal charges.31
While the
“search” in question did not involve physically entering a
home, breaking doors, or encroaching into a private space,
the Court still considered the holding one encompassing “the
very essence of constitutional liberty and security.” 32 At
bottom, the Court recognized the Fourth Amendment as a
key tenant of liberty and extended the definition of a “search”

Davies, supra note 20, at 567-568 (describing American
colonists’ memory of three episodes of controversy over English
search authority and the Framer’s subsequent adoption of
constitutional search and seizure provisions).
26 Davies, supra note 20, at 568.
27 Id.; see also NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 106 (1937) (discussing the dearth of Fourth
Amendment cases before the Supreme Court before 1886).
28 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 616.
29 Id. at 638.
30 Id. at 617-618.
31 Id. at 633-634 (“We are also clearly of opinion that proceedings
instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man’s
property by reason of offences committed by him, though they be
civil in form, are in their nature criminal.”).
32 Id. at 630.
25
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beyond the breaking of doors or the trespassing of a home.33
The Boyd Court recommended a “liberal construction” of the
constitutional provisions for the security of persons and
property.34 “It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon.”35
At its core, the Fourth Amendment demands that
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures
apply to all citizens, whether or not they are accused of a
crime.36 The Supreme Court has explained: “The purpose of
the Fourth Amendment is to prevent unreasonable
governmental intrusion into the privacy of one’s person,
house, papers or effects. The wrong condemned is the
unjustified governmental invasion of these areas of an
individual’s life.”37 That said, the extent of protection and
how to enforce this right differs, depending on the court’s
perspective.

B. TWO COMPETING PERSPECTIVES DOMINATE FOURTH
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE.
Two perspectives exist in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence:
the atomistic view and the regulatory view.38 The atomistic
perspective
views
the
Fourth
Amendment
as
39
individualistic. From this perspective, protections afforded
by the Fourth Amendment exist in individual spheres of
interest of individual citizens.40 The right to be secure in
papers, persons, and property should be enforced, but in a
Id. (“The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very
essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther
than the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its
adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the
part of the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life.”).
34 Id. at 635.
35 Id.
36 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
37 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974); see also
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983); New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981).
38 Amsterdam, supra note 8 at 367.
39 Id.
40 Id.
33
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limited way, based on individual expectations.41 The second
perspective, the regulatory perspective, sees the Fourth
Amendment protections as a method of regulating
governmental conduct.42 Rather than protect the rights of
the individual, the Fourth Amendment shields the people as
a collective from government infringement.43 The primary
method to deter the government from intruding is regulating
and deterring police misconduct.44 To deter misconduct,
evidence, even relevant, incriminating evidence, ought to be
excluded from a criminal proceeding.45 The Supreme Court
originally contemplated a wide application of this rule.46
Standing and the exclusionary rule are rooted in the
competing
perspectives
of
Fourth
Amendment
jurisprudence.47 Standing is rooted in the atomistic, or
individual perspective, allowing a person to assert only an
individual right to privacy in court, while the exclusionary
rule functions in modern jurisprudence as mostly regulatory
and recognizes the collective.48 While the exclusionary rule
is broad and protects the collective, standing requirements
often prevent a defendant from exercising the exclusionary
rule because the government did not intrude upon an
individual right.49
The competing perspectives and
rationales lead to tension in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.50 The tension is present, too, in the circuit
Id. (“Plainly, the Supreme Court is operating on the atomistic
view, although it has never discussed the issue.”).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222.
45 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) (citing People v. Cahan,
44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P. 2d 905, 911 (1955) (“[O]ther remedies
have completely failed to secure compliance with the
constitutional provisions . . .”) (brackets added).
46 Id. at 655 (“We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a state court.”).
47 Amsterdam, supra note 32 at 367.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law
Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private
Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 274 (1988)(arguing the
41
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split examined in this note. Whether a court may permit the
government to challenge standing for the first time on appeal
may be informed by the court’s view of the Fourth
Amendment as atomistic or regulatory.

C. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ENFORCES THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
The exclusionary rule gives force and effect to the
Fourth Amendment.51 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
now treats the exclusionary rule as regulatory or a protection
of the collective.52 Admittedly, the exclusionary rule may
exclude
relevant,
incriminating
evidence
from
consideration.53 Courts justify this social cost in two ways.54
First, and perhaps the more cited reason, is factual.55
Excluding relevant, incriminating evidence should
encourage future practices conforming with Constitutional
demands.56 The second justification is normative.57 The
normative justification enforces the belief that courts should
not participate in illegal acts.58
This should include
presiding over a proceeding where illegally obtained
evidence is proffered against a defendant.59

exclusionary rule prevents future harms for the collective rather
than redresses harm done to a defendant moving to suppress, and
thus standing should play no part of the calculus); See also Colb,
supra note 4 (arguing the exclusionary rule and standing are
logically inapposite).
51 Belton, 453 U.S. at 458.
52 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
53 Andrew M. Carter, Good Cops, Bad Cops, and the Exclusionary
Rule, 23 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 239, 240 (2021)(“But, at least on
paper, there are still plenty of circumstances where the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule contemplates a plainly guilty
murderer escaping justice because of an officer's otherwise de
minimis Fourth Amendment violation.”).
54 Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 668 (1970).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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To regulate against government intrusion, courts
created and continue to create an elaborate tapestry of
Fourth Amendment doctrine making specific decisions about
what, when, and where police may investigate crime.60 This
elaborate doctrine seeks to regulate police protocol and
behavior to protect privacy.61
The exclusionary rule
functions to prevent evidence collected or otherwise obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment from being used in
court.62 The exclusionary rule is prophylactic, created by the
judiciary, and formulated to protect a constitutional right.63
The Supreme Court of the United States first
articulated the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States
in 1914.64 Justice William R. Day, penning the opinion of the
unanimous court, reversed the Western District of Missouri
and held a warrantless seizure of documents from a private
home violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures.65 More importantly,
the Court held evidence obtained during an illegal search is

Andrew McLetchie, The Case for Bright-Line Rules in Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence: Adopting the Tenth Circuit’s BrightLine Test for Determining the Voluntariness of Consent, 30
HOFSTRA L. REV. 225, 230 (2001) (“The exclusionary rule is the
seminal bright-line rule in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence . .
.”).
61 Carter, supra note 53 at 242 (“For the modern Supreme Court,
the benefit of the rule is its deterrence effect: we accept the costs
of the exclusionary rule because the rule deters those police
officers who--by dint of malice, recklessness, or negligence--might
otherwise intrude on a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights.”).
62 Id. at 240; see also Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393.
63 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963)
(Application of the exclusionary rule on Wong Sun’s behalf
protected Fourth Amendment guarantees by “. . . deterring
lawless conduct by federal officers” and by “closing the doors of
the federal courts to any use of evidence unconstitutionally
obtained.”). See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217
(1960) (“The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its
purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the
incentive to disregard it.”).
64 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398 (“In holding [the letters] and permitting
their use at trial, we think prejudicial error was committed.”).
65 Id.
60
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excluded from use in federal criminal prosecutions.66 To
permit the use of private documents seized illegally in a court
of law would mean the protection of the Fourth Amendment
declaring a right to be secure against such searches and
seizures would be of no value.67 Further, because federal
prosecutions could not rely on evidence secured by an illegal
search and seizure, in the future federal law enforcement
officers would adhere to the confines of a legal search and
seizure.68 In other words, because evidence obtained illegally
is barred, federal law enforcement officers must operate
legally in searches to secure evidence for future federal
prosecution. Finally, the Weeks Court declared “a conviction
based on unlawfully seized evidence should find no sanction
in the judgment of the courts.” 69 Thus, the exclusionary rule
was born to direct law enforcement conduct and reinforce
confidence in the judicial system.
Nearly five decades later, the exclusionary rule first
pronounced in Weeks extended beyond federal criminal
proceedings to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.70
The Court recognized the rule excluding illegally obtained
evidence protects liberties considered “fundamental by the
Constitution.”71 In sum, the exclusionary rule is
constitutionally underpinned.72 The rule is an essential
ingredient of the Fourth Amendment, the Court held, and is
enforced against the States by the Due Process Clause. The
Court felt “led to close the only courtroom door remaining
open to evidence secured by official lawlessness” by
extending the Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy to the
states.73 As a result, the Court determined all evidence
Id.
Id. at 393.
68 Id. at 391-392.
69 Id. at 392.
70 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
71 Id. at 649 (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 339340 (1943))(citing
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 616 and Weeks, 232 U.S. at 383).
72 See Carter, supra note 53 at n. 4 citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at
348 (”In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the
party aggrieved.”).
73 Id. at 654-655.
66
67
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obtained by unlawful searches and seizures is also
inadmissible in state court.74
When extending the exclusionary rule to the states,
Mapp v. Ohio directly acknowledged and reinforced the
purpose of the exclusionary rule stated in Weeks.75 “The
purpose”, the Court held, “is to deter—to compel respect for
the constitutional guaranty in the only effective way
available —by removing the incentive to disregard it.”76 At
its core, the exclusionary rule is not a remedy for an
individual’s injury.77 The rule, instead, is designed to punish
violators and protect future search targets.78 By excluding
illegally obtained evidence, government actors will conform
their behavior in later searches and seizures to avoid the
exclusion.79 Weeks, Mapp, and the decisions that follow
continue to rely on the normative and factual justifications
for the exclusionary rule.80

D. THE COURT LIMITS THE AVAILABILITY OF THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE WITH STANDING.
While the willingness to exclude illegally obtained
evidence became a federal tenant in the early 20th Century,
and extended to the states in the early 1960s, a desire for a
limited application of the exclusionary rule emerged in the
mid-to-late 20th Century. In Weeks v. United States and
Mapp v. Ohio the Court reflected a sweeping approach to
exclusion.81 The Court wrote, “[w]e hold that all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the

Id. at 655.
Id.
76 Id. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217
(1960)).
77 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976); United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909, 921 (1984); Herring v. United States,
555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009); Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 23637 (2011) ( “The rule's sole purpose, we have repeatedly held, is to
deter future Fourth Amendment violations.”).
81 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
74
75
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Constitution is . . . inadmissible in a state court.”82 And yet
in a series of cases the Court limited the availability of the
remedy in multiple ways. This limitation includes requiring
a defendant have standing to challenge the legality of search.
The Court requires a greater connection between
wrongful state action and the person invoking the
exclusionary rule by requiring “standing.”83 While the word
“standing” may stir thoughts of constitutional law and
Article III standing, Justices are careful to point out this is a
separate, distinct concept.84 Standing, in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, describes the legal status of a person and
whether they may seek to exclude evidence under the
exclusionary rule.85 In this sense, standing is rooted in the
atomistic perspective, unlike the exclusionary rule.86
Today, a person must have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in a thing or place to challenge a search.87 Before
Rakas v. Illinois, the Supreme Court required a legitimate
presence on the premises to challenge a search88. This sense
of standing, first set forth in Jones v. United States,
precluded a person improperly present from asserting a
privacy expectation in the premises searched.89 In Jones, a
defendant accused of narcotics possession motioned to
suppress evidence uncovered in a search of an apartment in
which he was a guest.90 The government argued that, even
if the defendant entered the apartment as an invitee, he
lacked a possessory interest in the apartment as owner.91
The Court rejected the idea that a possessory interest and
the concept of standing should necessarily follow private
property law and instead found the defendant met the
standing requirement to challenge the search.92
The
defendant, the Court reasoned, was properly in the

Id.
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140.
84 Id.
82
83

Id.
Amsterdam, supra note 8 at 367.
87 Rakas, 439 at 140.
88 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960).
89 Id.
90 Id. at 259.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 266.
85
86
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apartment and therefore had a possessory interest in the
property such that he could expect privacy.93
Nearly eighteen years later, the concept of standing
transformed. The Court rejected the notion that standing
simply required a possessory interest in the property as
Jones suggested.94 In Rakas v. Illinois the Supreme Court
affirmed an Illinois Appellate Court decision denying a
motion to suppress evidence.95 Rakas involved a vehicle
search yielding evidence of a robbery—rifle shells and a
sawed-off shotgun.96 The occupants of the vehicle moved to
suppress the rifle and shells seized from the car because the
search violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.97
The petitioners conceded they did not own the vehicle, the
shells, nor the rifle.98 They were simply passengers in the
vehicle.99
The prosecutors challenged the petitioners’
standing to object to the lawfulness of the search of the car
because they did not own the car.100 The trial court, as well
as the Appellate Court of Illinois, agreed the petitioners’
lacked an individual, reasonable expectation of privacy in the
vehicle.101
Holding that “Fourth Amendment rights are personal
rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not
be vicariously asserted” the court rejected the “target” theory
permitting a defendant the right to challenge the violation of
the Fourth Amendment rights of a third party.102 The Court
also rejected the Jones holding permitting a defendant
standing to challenge the legality of a search when she was
legitimately on a premises.103 Simply put, the question is
whether the challenged search or seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment rights of a criminal defendant who seeks to
exclude the evidence obtained.104
Id. at 265.
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133.
95 Id. at 150.
96 Id. at 129.
97 Id. at 130.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 130-131.
101 Id. at 131.
102 Id. at 130 citing Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174.
103 Id. at 148.
104 Id. at 140.
93
94
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The Court reasoned that since Fourth Amendment
rights are individual, it is proper to permit only a defendant
whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated to benefit
from the exclusionary rule’s protections.105 The exclusionary
rule is designed to enforce that individual right.106
Benefitting from the exclusionary rule while challenging a
violative search vicariously would be improper.
Justice Rehnquist bristled at labeling the inquiry as
“standing” in the traditional Article III meaning. 107 The
Court eliminated standing as an independent, preliminary
inquiry.108 Instead, Rehnquist framed the inquiry as “simply
recognizing [the inquiry] as one involving the substantive
question of whether or not the proponent of the motion to
suppress has had his own Fourth Amendment rights
infringed by the search and seizure which he seeks to
challenge.”109 In other words, a person who challenges a
search to a third party’s premises or property has not had his
own Fourth Amendment rights infringed. It is not the same
inquiry as Article III standing, but a substantive part of
determining whether the Fourth Amendment was violated
during a search or seizure.110
The Court continues to examine issues of standing in
the 21st Century as culture changes.111 In Byrd v. United
States in 2018 the Court addressed whether rental car
drivers who are not on the rental agreement (e.g., a person
given the keys to drive by a person who is authorized to
drive) have standing to object to a search of the car.112 The
Court distinguished this case from Rakas and held that a
person alone in a rental car has an individual reasonable
expectation of privacy and thus has standing to challenge a
search of the car.113
Because the Court continues to approach Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence from both an atomistic and
Id.
Id. at 134 citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389
(1968).
107 Id. at 139-40.
108 Id. at 133.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1518.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 1531.
105
106
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regulatory perspective, tension persists. This tension is seen
at the appellate level when courts confront whether the
government may ever waive the right to challenge standing.
Courts use waiver of the standing argument to advance a
broad exclusionary rule or permit standing challenges to
limit the utility of the exclusionary rule. Courts do this by
considering the objection waived, never waived at any point,
or potentially waived, depending on the circumstances of the
case. An approach never waiving an objection to standing
effectively permits a smaller population to use the
exclusionary rule. An approach that considers the objection
waived, without question, at the appellate level, permits a
larger population to use the exclusionary rule.

III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON WAIVING A CHALLENGE TO
STANDING
The Supreme Court of the United States addressed
whether the government may waive standing once but used
permissive language.114 In Steagald v. United States, the
Court suggested that the government may waive the right to
raise factual issues related to standing when it makes
contrary assertions in the courts below, when it acquiesces
in contrary findings by those courts, or when it fails to raise
such questions during litigation.115 In Steagald, a Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent received
confidential information suggesting he could locate a federal
fugitive named Lyons wanted on drug charges in Atlanta.116
The DEA agent contacted Southern Bell Telephone
Company, retrieved the address associated with the phone
number the informant disclosed, and stormed the home with
eleven other agents.117 The agents did not find Lyons but
detained several at the home.118 During the search of the
house, the agent observed what he believed to be cocaine.119
While the agent waited on a search warrant, the group
conducted a second search of the house (without a warrant)
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
Id. at 209.
116 Id. at 206.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
114
115
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and uncovered more incriminating evidence.120 A third
search, with a warrant, unearthed 43 pounds of cocaine.121
As a result, agents arrested Steagald on federal drug
charges.122
Steagald moved to suppress all evidence uncovered in
the various searches conducted without warrants. 123 The
agent testified to his belief that the arrest warrant for Lyons
was enough to permit a search of the home.124 The District
Court agreed and denied the motion to suppress. 125
On appeal, the government suggested Steagald
lacked an expectation of privacy in the house and therefore
lacked standing to challenge the search of the home.126 The
argument was never raised in the courts below.127 The
government, in fact, asserted in its brief in opposition to
certiorari Steagald lived in the home, which suggests
standing to challenge a search.
Yet the government
presented evidence to the contrary at oral arguments and
suggested Steagald did not live in the home.128 Mere
presence in the home did not give Steagald standing to
challenge the search, the government argued.129
The Supreme Court declined to follow the
government’s argument that the petitioner lacked
standing.130 The government, the Court said, was first
entitled, at the district court, to defend against Steagald’s
motion to suppress by challenging his personal, reasonable
expectation of privacy (his standing) in the place searched.131
The government instead argued petitioners lived in the
home.132 The Court held that the government may lose the
right to raise factual issues at the Supreme Court in some

Id. at 206-207.
Id. at 207.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 208.
127 Id. at 208-209.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 209.
131 Id.
132 Id.
120
121
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cases.133 On that basis, the Court then concluded this was
just such a case.134
Because the government argued
inconsistent facts on appeal, the Court rejected the argument
that the defendant lacked standing.135 As a result of the
permissive language of Steagald, there is a tri-part split
within the circuits.
There are three basic approaches to whether the
government may waive a challenge to standing if it is not
asserted at the district court level. The First and Eighth
Circuits do not permit the government to waive Fourth
Amendment standing issues, even if it fails to raise them in
the district court.136 Seven other circuits hold that the
government does, in fact, waive Fourth Amendment
standing challenges in some cases. Within the general
approach that a challenge to standing is waived if not
asserted at the district court level, there are five circuits (the
Third, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh) that hold the
government completely concedes the issue if it fails to
challenge Fourth Amendment standing at the district
level.137 The Ninth Circuit gives the government lenience.138
Fourth Amendment standing may be raised for the first time
on appeal in this circuit, but a failure to place a challenge in
the appellate brief will waive the challenge.139
The
government may not bring up the issue for the first time at
oral arguments.140 Finally, the Sixth Circuit is “waivefriendly” in that, like the Ninth Circuit, the government may
lose the ability to appeal in some cases.141 Still, the Sixth
Circuit allows the government to object to a defendant’s
Fourth Amendment standing for the first time on appeal if
the government can show the defendant plainly lacked
standing and a failure to recognize such would “seriously
Id.
Id.
135 Id.
136 Bouffard, 917 F.2d at 674; Rodriguez-Arreola, 270 F.3d at 616.
137 United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2010); United
States v. Lightbourn, 357 Fed. App’x 259, 264 (11th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Gonzales, 79 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 1996); Price,
54 F.3d at 345; Dewitt 946 F.2d at 1497-1500.
138 United States v. Paopao, 469 F.3d 760, 764 (9th Cir. 2006).
139 Taketa, 923 F.2d at 670.
140 Id.
141 Noble, 762 F.3d at 527.
133
134
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affect…the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.”142 The Sixth Circuit, like the Ninth, would
consider the issue waived if not raised in the opening brief
on appeal.143 The lack of guidance from the Supreme Court
explains the tripartite split of the circuits, though each
circuit lays out the competing government interests and need
to protect the rights of defendants in case law in differing
ways.

A. THE FIRST AND EIGHT CIRCUITS HOLD STANDING
CANNOT BE WAIVED BY THE GOVERNMENT.
Two circuits permit the government to bring a
challenge to standing for the first time at the appellate level.
The First and the Eighth Circuits, respectively, permit the
government to bring an initial challenge to standing despite
failure to challenge at the district level, for differing reasons.

i. THE FIRST CIRCUIT APPROACH
The First Circuit, in United States v. Bouffard, 917
F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1990) considered whether the government
conceded the defendant’s standing to challenge a search. The
United States District Court for the District of New
Hampshire refused to suppress a short-barreled shotgun
seized from an automobile operated by Bouffard, the
defendant just before the seizure.144 Bouffard’s sister-in-law
loaned him the car, to be returned at 5:00 p.m. the next
day.145 When the car was not returned, the sister-in-law
sought police assistance in recovering the vehicle.146 When
reporting the vehicle missing, she confirmed Bouffard was
driving her husband’s 1979 Mercury Cougar.147 She reported
Bouffard’s girlfriend likely accompanied him on the car
ride.148 Bouffard’s argument at the District Court suggested
the police had little interest in recovering the vehicle until
Id. at 528.
Id.
144 Bouffard, 917 F.2d at 674.
145 Id. at 674, n. 1.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
142
143
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they learned Bouffard had many outstanding warrants for
his arrest, at which time they issued a bulletin report that
Bouffard should be considered “armed and dangerous”—to
his sister-in-law’s protest.149 The police assured her the
characterization was merely precautionary.150
The search began. Upon locating the 1979 Mercury
Cougar parked at a public boat landing and verifying
ownership to the Bouffard family, the defendant approached
police and was handcuffed and placed in the vehicle.151 Police
located a short-barreled shotgun in the locked trunk of the
car under two bags of clothing, while allegedly searching for
the female suspect.152 The weapon was not visible until the
bag was moved.153
Bouffard challenged the search in District Court as
merely pretextual.154 The District Court rejected this
argument but declined to consider whether the act of lifting
the garbage bag constituted a “search” because the
defendant did not challenge this.155 The government failed
to challenge, as suggested by Rakas, whether the defendant
showed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the trunk of the
automobile.156
The court noted that the issue in this case, whether remand
was appropriate to enable further factfinding about
Bouffard’s reasonable expectation of privacy, was more like
the Supreme Court’s decision in Combs v. United States, 408
U.S. 224, 227 (1972) than Rakas.157 In Combs, a per curiam
opinion, the Court ordered a remand where a prosecutor did
not challenge the defendant’s “standing.” 158 Rakas, of course,
refused to remand where a prosecutor challenged “standing”

Id.
Id.
151 Id. at 674.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 674-675.
156 Id. at 675.
157 Id. at 677, citing Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227228 (1972) (per curiam) (ordering remand where prosecutor did
not challenge defendant’s “standing”).
158 Combs, 408 U.S. at 227-228.
149
150
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at a suppression hearing.159 As in Combs, the Bouffard
prosecutors conceded standing at the district court level and
at arguments on appeal.160 The Bouffard court wondered if,
like Combs, the defendant failed to assert a privacy claim to
the search premises because the government failed to
challenge standing.161 In other words, a defendant may
rightfully fail to clearly assert his privacy interests in
searched premises when the government does not suggest
they lack the standing to claim such interest.
The court directed the district court to conduct a
“standing” inquiry, despite the government’s concession of
the defendant’s standing in both the district court and on
appeal.162 The court noted the clear “insufficiency of
evidence to demonstrate that the defendant possessed a
legitimate expectation of privacy.”163 The court reasoned the
remand was necessary for three reasons.164
First,
fundamental fairness would dictate that the defendant
deserved an opportunity to present evidence establishing his
expectation of privacy.165 The government’s concession of
standing at the district court level and at oral arguments on
appeal could explain why the defendant presented no
evidence to establish his private interest in the car or gun.166
Should the government now challenge standing, fairness
requires that the defendant be permitted to prove a case.
Beyond fairness, a remand would allow the district court to
consider, for the first time, whether the defendant can
establish a legitimate expectation of privacy, this time with
an adequate record.167 The district court made no findings
for the record because the defendant failed to put on evidence
proving an expectation of privacy in the property searched
and items seized, and the government failed to put on
evidence of its lack.168 For these reasons, the Court of
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130-131, n. 1 (refusing to remand where
prosecutor challenged “standing” at suppression hearing).
160 Bouffard, 917 F.2d at 677.
161 Id. at 677, citing Combs, 408 U.S. at 227.
162 Bouffard, 917 F.2d at 677.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
159
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Appeals, though permitted to do so by appellate procedure
rules, felt it could not make a reliable determination on the
fact-dependent issues underpinning the Fourth Amendment
claim on the record before it.169

ii. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT DISREGARDS RAKAS
As in the First Circuit, the government may object to
standing at any time, including on appeal in the Eighth
Circuit.170 The Eighth Circuit, like the First Circuit, permits
the challenge to standing on appeal even if the government
fails to include it in the brief or at oral arguments. 171 The
Eighth Circuit’s reasoning, however, is different from that of
the First Circuit.172
The Eighth Circuit reasoning sounds in Article III
standing.173 In United States v. Rodriguez-Arreola, 270 F.3d
611 (8th Cir. 2001), after a routine vehicle stop, the driver of
the vehicle, Molina, answered the questions of police officers
about his immigration status as well as his passenger
Rodriguez-Arreola’s status.174 The officer questioned Molina
whether his passenger had a green card, to which Molina
replied “No.”175
When the government later charged RodriguezArreola under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (Supp. IV 1998) with being
an “illegal alien present in the United States after
deportation,” he moved to suppress all evidence obtained
during the traffic stop.176 The defendant argued police
obtained his immigration status through an illegal search in
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.177 While the
defendant did not argue that the initial stop of the vehicle for
Id.
Rodriguez-Arreola, 270 F.3d at 616.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 617.
173 Id. at 617 (citing Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 752, 757 n.
4 (8th Cir. 1994) (“It is elementary that standing relates to the
justiciability of a case and cannot be waived by the parties.”)).
174 Id. at 613.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 615 (citing United States v. Rodriguez-Arreola, No. CR 0040071 (D.S.D. October 24, 2000) (Motion to Suppress)).
177 Id.
169
170
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speeding was improper, he did assert that his rights were
violated when the officer posited questions about his identity
to the driver.178 The United States District Court for the
District of South Dakota granted the defendant’s motion to
suppress.179
The government appealed, arguing, among other
things, that even if the officer’s questions to Molina
constituted an unconstitutional search and seizure, the
questions violated Molina’s constitutional rights, not
Rodriguez-Arreola’s right to remain free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.180 Simply put, on appeal, the
government challenged Rodriguez-Arreola’s standing to
suppress the evidence based on these questions. RodriguezArreola argued the government waived any argument to
challenge a Fourth Amendment violation when it failed to do
so in the district court.181
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the government.182
The opinion cited United States v. Stallings, 28 F.3d 58, 60
(8th Cir. 1994) which held that a defendant must have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the places or objects
searched to challenge a search or seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.183 The Rodriguez-Arreola court held that
Rodriguez, in relying on the questions asked to Molina to
establish an illegal search, sought to assert another
individual’s rights rather than his own184. The court then
addressed whether the government may waive a defendant’s
lack of standing.185 Finding that any argument based on
waiver must fail, the court determined the government
cannot waive a right to challenge a lack of standing.186 To
support this notion, the Eighth Circuit cited Sierra Club v.
Id.
Id.
180 Id. at 615-16.
181 Id. at 616.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 616 (citing United States v. Stallings, 28 F.3d 58 (8th Cir.
1994).
184 Id. at 616-617 (citing Stallings, 28 F.3d 58, 60 (8th Cir. 1994)
(“In order to have standing to challenge a search or seizure under
the Fourth Amendment, the defendant must have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the places or objects searched.”)).
185 Id. at 617.
186 Id.
178
179
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Robertson, 28 F.3d 753, 757 n. 4 (8th Cir. 1994).187 This case
addressed Article III standing and justiciability.188 The
Sierra Club argued that the appellees failed to appeal the
District Court’s determination on standing and therefore
waived the issues.189 The Sierra Club court note that
standing, in the Article III sense, is “elementary” as it relates
to the justiciability of a case and cannot be waived by the
parties.190 The Sierra Club footnote reference in RodriguezArreola further cites a 1985 Eighth Circuit case that asserts
the justiciability of a case must be considered at any court,
at any level, even when the parties have not raised the
issue.191
Asserting that the government could challenge
Rodriguez-Arreola’s standing for the first time at the
appellate level, the court then concluded the government did
not violate Rodriguez-Arreola’s Fourth Amendment
rights.192 The Eighth Circuit reversed the District Court’s
suppression order and remanded for further proceedings.193
At bottom, the Eighth Circuit determined the
government cannot waive a defendant’s lack of standing in
Fourth Amendment cases based on an understanding of
Article III standing, which contradicts Supreme Court
precedent in Rakas. The decision stands in the Eighth
Circuit, has no support in other circuits, and has been
questioned by at least one district court in the Eighth Circuit
itself.194
Id.
Sierra Club, 28 F.3d 753, 757 n. 4 (8th Cir. 1994).
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. at n. 4 (citing Olin Water Servs. V. Midland Research Labs.,
Inc., 774 F.2d 303, 306 n.3 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting that the
justiciability of a case must be considered by a court even when the
parties have not raised the issue)).
192 Rodriguez-Arreola, 270 F.3d at 619.
193 Id.
194 See United States v. Foster, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 2011 (D Minn.
2011) (“This Court must ordinarily follow Eighth Circuit precedent
regardless of whether that precedent is, in this Court's opinion,
correctly decided. But when a decision of the Eighth Circuit
conflicts with a decision of the United States Supreme Court, this
Court must, of course, follow the decision of the United States
187
188
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B. THE THIRD, FIFTH, SEVENTH, TENTH, AND
ELEVENTH CIRCUITS CONSIDER THE ISSUE OF
FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDING WAIVED IF THE
GOVERNMENT FAILS TO RAISE IT AT THE DISTRICT
COURT LEVEL.
In the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh
circuits, failure to challenge standing at the district court
level is a concession.195 As a result, these circuits consider
the concession a complete waiver and permit no contrary
argument on appeal.196 The approaches find common ground
in Rakas and Steagald.197
In particular, the Third Circuit posits the government
waives a right to challenge standing if the argument is not
addressed at the district court level.198 In United States v.
Stearn the Third Circuit acknowledged other approaches in
sister circuits in a footnote.199 The Third Circuit formulated
a rule to accord Rakas and Steagald.200 In the Third Circuit,
as in the Fifth and Seventh, when the government concedes
standing, it is precluded from challenging it on appeal.201
The Third Circuit reasoned that standing, in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, functions as an element of a
claim rather than a jurisdictional inquiry, citing Rakas
language.202 The Third Circuit also recognized that standing
Supreme Court. That is the situation here, as Rodriguez-Arreola's
holding about Fourth Amendment “standing” directly contradicts
the holding of a binding Supreme Court case — Steagald v. United
States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1981).”).
195 Stearn, 597 F.3d at 540; Lightbourn, 357 Fed. App’x at 264
Gonzales, 79 F.3d at 419; Price, 54 F.3d at 345; Dewitt, 946 F.2d at
1497-1500.
196 Stearn, 597 F.3d at 570, n. 11.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id. citing United States v. Amuny, 767 F.2d 1113, 1122 (5th
Cir. 1985) (holding the government “forfeited” its opportunity to
challenge “standing” on appeal where it conceded “standing” in
the district court) and United States v. Cellitti, 387 F.3d 618, 623
(7th Cir. 2004).
202 Id. citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139.
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is subject to the ordinary rule that an argument not posited
at the district court is waived on appeal, citing Steagald.203
In doing so, the Stearn court criticized the First Circuit’s
approach in Bouffard.204 The Third Circuit found Bouffard’s
holding permitting a court to review standing sua sponte
problematic, as this treats Fourth Amendment standing as
“jurisdictional.”205 In effect, the Third Circuit considered the
First and Eighth Circuit approaches similar, despite the
First Circuit’s attempt to root the Bouffard decision in
Rakas’s approach to standing— not a preliminary inquiry
but part of the substantive analysis of the Fourth
Amendment.

C. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT APPROACH DISTINGUISHES
FORFEITURE AND WAIVER, STILL PERMITS A
CHALLENGE ON APPEAL . . . SOMETIMES.
The Sixth Circuit permits the government, in some
cases, to waive the ability to challenge standing at the
appellate level.206 The court addressed the circuit split in
United States v. Noble, a case involving a defendant (“Noble”)
subjected to a patdown during a traffic stop.207 Noble was a
passenger in a car suspected of drug trafficking.208 Pulled
over for a window tint violation as well as an illegal lane
change, Noble was asked to exit the passenger compartment
of the car.209 Noble’s patdown resulted from his “nervous
demeanor” and “known status as a drug dealer.”210 The
patdown yielded methamphetamine, a glass pipe, a pill
bottle, and a weapon.211 The agents conducting the stop
ordered a search warrant for the car and a hotel room the
Id. citing Steagald, 451 U.S. at 209.
Id. (“We believe [the First Circuit’s] view treats Fourth
Amendment “standing” as a jurisdictional requirement rather
than an element of a Fourth Amendment claim, and we believe it
is inconsistent with Rakas.”).
205 Id.
206 Noble, 762 F.3d 527.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 515.
209 Id. at 515-16.
210 Id. at 516.
211 Id.
203
204
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trio occupied based on the patdown and contraband.212 The
search discovered scales, ziplock bags, and more meth.213 In
court, Noble questioned the length of the stop and the
patdown based on his nervous demeanor.214 Co-defendants
adopted Noble’s motion to suppress. 215 The motion was
denied at the district court.216 Upon denial, Noble and his
two co-defendants accepted plea deals offered by the United
States Attorney.217
Noble appealed the denied
218
suppression.
In examining the length of the stop, the Sixth Circuit
found no error.219 But to the patdown, the court agreed that
“nervousness” is not part of the calculus of reasonable
suspicion and ruled the search illegal.220
Further, a
passenger’s presence in a vehicle suspected of drug
trafficking is not reasonable suspicion to justify a
patdown.221 As a result, the motion to suppress was
inappropriately denied.222
Since Noble’s co-defendants
adopted his motion to suppress, this left the court with an
“awkward problem.”223 The co-defendants did not address
their standing to challenge the search or admissibility of the
contraband.224 By the court’s estimation, they had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in Noble’s patdown.225
Still, the government failed to contest the co-defendants
standing to challenge the search in district court.226 The
Sixth Circuit was “at a loss to understand why,” given the
court’s previous decisions that drivers lack standing to
challenge a search of passengers in a car.227 To determine the
Id. at 517.
Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 518.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 521.
220 Id. at 522.
221 Id. at 525.
222 Id. at 525-26.
223 Id. at 526.
224 Id.
225 Id. (“[I]t appears that [co-defendants] lack standing to
challenge Officer Ray's patdown of Noble.”) (brackets added).
226 Id. at 526-27.
227 Id. at 526.
212
213
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outcome, the court reviewed the circuit split and varying
approaches to whether an objection to standing may be
waived by the government.228
The Sixth Circuit considers “standing” analogous to
an element of a claim.229 For that reason, the government can
forfeit and waive any objections to a defendant’s Fourth
Amendment standing.230 The Noble court criticized the
jurisdictional and Article III approaches to Fourth
Amendment standing of the First and Eighth circuits as did
the Third Circuit in Stearn.231 While the court cited several
cases implicitly rejecting the jurisdictional or Article III
approach to standing, the court explicitly did so in Noble.232
The court reasoned that the Supreme Court made clear that
Fourth Amendment standing does not sound in Article III.233
On the other hand, in the Sixth Circuit, there are
exceptions to the general rule that the government forfeits
the right to challenge standing if they do not address the
issue at the district court level.234 The Noble court described
a situation in which it would permit the government to raise
an objection to a defendant’s Fourth Amendment standing
on appeal.235 The court would allow the government to raise
an objection to a defendant's Fourth Amendment standing
for the first time on appeal as long as the government can
show that the defendant plainly lacked standing and that a
failure to recognize it would “seriously affect[] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”236 A
failure to brief the matter on appeal would extinguish the

Id. at 527.
Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. (“The First and Eighth Circuits’ approach is, in our view,
misguided.”).
232 Id. (citing United States v. Washington, 380 F.3d 236, 240 n.3
(6th Cir. 2004) and United States v. Dyer, 580 F.3d 386, 390 (6th
Cir. 2009)).
233 Id. (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139).
234 Id. at 528.
235 Id.
236 Id. (citing United States v. Barajas-Nunez, 91 F.3d 826, 830
(6th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets in
original).
228
229
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ability to challenge any error under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure Rule 52.237
The Sixth Circuit explained this exception in the
context of the words “forfeit” and “waive.”238 Some other
circuits addressing this issue use the words “forfeit” and
“waive” interchangeably, but the Sixth Circuit distinguished
the two in formulating the Noble decision.239 Citing the
Supreme Court decision in Olano, the Noble court noted that
the words have distinct meanings and consequences.240 A
forfeiture represents a failure to make a timely assertion of
a right.241 A forfeiture may be reviewed only if there is a
plain error affecting “substantial rights.”242 In contrast, a
waiver is the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right.”243 A waiver extinguishes the ability to
challenge any error under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure Rule 52.244
For those reasons, the Sixth Circuit considered the
government’s failure to challenge standing at the district
court in Noble a forfeiture.245 Thus, the government could
have raised the objection for the first time on appeal. This
would require evidence the co-defendants “plainly lacked
standing” and a failure to recognize this would “seriously
affect” the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.246 That said, the government failed to brief the
issue on appeal and thus waived the argument objecting to
the defendants’ standing.247
While the Sixth Circuit is “waive friendly,” it
evidences a willingness to permit a challenge to standing at
the appellate level.248
Indeed, had the government
Id. (citing United States v. Ford, 184 F.3d 566, 578 n.3 (6th
Cir. 1999).
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id. (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)).
241 Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938))
(citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 733).
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id.
237
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challenged the defendants’ standing in the appellate brief, it
may have won the matter. The Noble court noted, “we are at
a loss to understand why the government did not contest
[defendants’] standing. . .” 249 It is clear in the Sixth Circuit
drivers lack standing to challenge the personal searches of
passengers and the contraband found during such
activities.250 It appeared evident that the defendants in
Noble lacked standing to challenge the passenger’s
patdown.251 Indeed, had the government merely forfeited the
argument at the district court, but addressed the issue in the
appellate brief on the matter, the convictions of the codefendants may have stood.

D. THE NINTH CIRCUIT “HYBRID” APPROACH
The Ninth Circuit approaches the issue of waiver in a
hybrid method, different than any previously mentioned
Circuit.252 The Ninth Circuit examines the issue in two
steps. First, the Ninth Circuit requires a preliminary
inquiry determining the party bringing the appeal.253
Second, the courts consider the arguments made below.254
For example, if the government appeals a grant of a
suppression motion, but failed to challenge standing at the
district court or in the appellate brief, the Ninth Circuit
considers the issue waived. 255 When a court grants a motion
to suppress, there is a reliance on a determination the
defendant had standing to challenge the search. That said,
if a defendant appeals a denial of a suppression motion, and
the government failed to challenge standing at the district
court, the government may raise the arguments for the first
time on appeal.256 The court justifies the challenge to
standing because when the defendant appeals a denial of a
motion to suppress, the burden shifts to her to prove the
Id. at 526.
Id. at 525.
251 Id. at 526.
252 Taketa, 923 F.2d at 670.
253 Paopao, 469 F.3d at 765 (quoting United States v. Nadler, 698
F.2d 995, 998 (9th Cir. 1983)).
254 Id.
255 United States v. Ewing, 638 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 2011).
256 Paopao, 469 F.3d at 764 (citing Taketa, 923 F.2d at 670).
249
250
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district court erred.257 Because the defendant bears the
burden, and reliance on a determination of an existing
privacy interest is not at issue, the issue of standing can be
raised for the first time on appeal.258

IV. A UNIFIED APPROACH GUARANTEES PROTECTION
AND ACKNOWLEDGES RISKS.
Whether the government may waive standing is a
paramount question.
The outcome determines the
availability of the exclusionary rule to defendants. As earlier
discussed, the exclusionary rule is the primary method by
which the Fourth Amendment may be enforced. In essence,
decisions on standing and waiver determine whether a
defendant may be afforded important Constitutional rights.
Because of this importance, the Supreme Court should
formulate a unified approach.
A unified approach to resolving the circuit split
should consider the goals of the exclusionary rule, the
importance of standing, and the role standing should play in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The circuits considering
these cases already use the issue to advance their views on
the importance of standing and the availability of the
exclusionary rule. With that in mind, the approach should
express the importance of protecting the collective
reasonable expectation of privacy in persons, places, and
effects through the exclusionary rule. The approach should
recognize the value of regulating government—including
prosecutor—behavior.
The approach should also
acknowledge the social cost of extending the exclusionary
rule to those asserting a right vicariously, and the risk of
excluding relevant, incriminating evidence. Finally, the
approach should discourage judicial sanction of illegal
searches, untimely appeals, and defend against stealthy
encroachments of Constitutional rights.

A. WITH GREAT POWER COMES GREAT
RESPONSIBILITY.

257
258

Id.
Id.
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Courts examining evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment face a big task. As discussed earlier,
there are atomistic and regulatory perspectives to balance.
There are factual and normative justifications of the
exclusionary rule to consider. There is a social cost that
accompanies excluding relevant but incriminating evidence.
At bottom, these courts must balance the constitutional
rights of citizens with the need to fight and prevent crime in
communities. That’s a tough task.
The exclusionary rule matters. The exclusionary rule
enforces the Fourth Amendment. Remedies other than the
exclusionary rule have proved ineffective in preventing
police and other agencies from violating the Fourth
Amendment.259 Money damages, agency discipline, and
supervision all exist as methods to prevent and punish law
enforcement misconduct in searches but cannot achieve what
exclusion can.260
Courts also point to the value the
exclusionary rule provides in defining the parameters of
permitted searches and seizures.261 A rule prohibiting the
use of illegally obtained evidence deters police misconduct in
searches and seizures.262 Decisions form a bright-line
rulebook for what law enforcement may do during
investigations.263 The exclusion of incriminating evidence

See, e.g., Carter, supra note 53 at 253 (“[H]istorically, § 1983
cases have not proven particularly effective at framing Fourth
Amendment issues for appellate court resolution.). Debate persists
about the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule and alternatives to
the exclusionary rule. Some argue the effect of the exclusionary
rule is actually to serve “good cops” with a list of permitted and
prohibited techniques to use on the job rather than to punish “bad
cops” who perform an illegal search.
260 Id. The effectiveness of § 1983 is also hotly debated and, in
modern times, there is perhaps little incentive for an individual to
pursue such a claim given the expansion of qualified immunity.
Money damages also do not lead to the exclusion of evidence at
trial.
261 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 953 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he chief deterrent function of the rule is its
tendency to promote institutional compliance . . .”).
262 Id. at 251-252.
263 Id. at 252.
259
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encourages law enforcement to comply with the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.264
What is more, besides law enforcement compliance
with relevant rules of criminal procedure, the exclusionary
rule also promotes public confidence in the judiciary.265
Citizens naturally lose respect for an institution that would
allow prosecutors to secure a conviction using evidence
obtained illegally.
Standing matters, too. The Court repeatedly reminds
us that the Fourth Amendment is a personal right, one that
may not be vicariously asserted. Standing prevents a person
from asserting the reasonable expectation of privacy of a
third party—an important point for the Supreme Court and
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
All that said, when relevant and incriminating
evidence against a criminal defendant is excluded by a court
decision, the court hamstrings law enforcement’s ability to
fight crime. As Justice Cardozo, then a justice on the Court
of Appeals of New York, said, “The criminal is to go free
because the constable has blundered.”266 Therein lies the
tension. Though the effects of the exclusionary rule may be
overstated, it is true that relevant and incriminating
evidence is unavailable to a trier of fact.267 The right of an
individual is protected at the expense of the community. The
concept of standing limits the effect of the exclusionary rule
to try to strike the appropriate balance between protecting
the individual right and protecting the community with
effective policing. The tension—excluding relevant and
incriminating evidence at the risk of the community or
allowing illegally obtained evidence in a court proceeding at
Leon, 468 U.S. at 953.
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656.
266 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21 (1926).
267 Carter, supra note 53 at 241. Of the thousands of motions filed
every year in courts across the country, a small percentage are
granted. A study in Chicago in 1987 found most cases involving a
granted motion to suppress involved crimes that wouldn’t have
received detention time anyway. See Peter F. Nardulli, The
Societal Costs of the Exclusionary Rule Revisited, U. ILL. L. REV.
223, 234-35 (1987) (reviewing study confirming that “vast
majority” of granted motions to exclude involve crimes when the
defendant, if convicted, “would never have been given detention
time”).
264
265
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the risk of the individual’s constitutional right—persists.
And the tension is apparent in each circuit’s approach to
waiver addressed in this paper. Because the tension between
the exclusionary rule and standing cannot disappear,
resolving the circuit split over standing and waiver requires
striking an appropriate balance that protects the collective
and the individual.

B. THE LANGUAGE CHANGES, BUT IT’S STILL ALL
ABOUT STANDING.
The circuits’ approaches discussed in this paper
ultimately comment on the importance of standing. A
mandatory waiver approach, taken by the Third, Fifth,
Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh essentially champions the
exclusionary rule as a remedy of a Constitutional violation
over the need to limit the remedy through standing. The
decisions in these circuits recognize that standing is
important and functions to ensure the Fourth Amendment
permits only those with personal, reasonable expectations of
privacy invasion can challenge a search. But the appropriate
time to do so is at the district court. The courts recognize
that standing is not jurisdictional, but an element of a
Fourth Amendment claim. The courts also acknowledge the
traditional rule that arguments waived at the district court
level may not be launched on appeal in most other cases. A
waiver may mean relevant, incriminating evidence is
excluded even when a defendant had no personal, reasonable
expectation of privacy. This outcome, while not ideal, is
valued by courts using this approach for three reasons. First,
the exclusionary rule is the best remedy for a Fourth
Amendment violation. Second, police and prosecutors must
operate within the bounds of the law. Courts must not take
part in presenting evidence obtained illegally. Finally, the
protection of the individual right outweighs the risk to the
community and the ability of the police to investigate and
fight crime. The appropriate balance between exclusion and
standing, in these circuits, tips more in favor of the
exclusionary rule, recognizing the risks associated with
excluding evidence but valuing a protection rooted in the
Constitution.
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In contrast, the approach of the First and Eighth
circuits prize standing and a limited exclusionary rule. By
permitting the court or government to challenge a
defendant’s standing at any time, including for the first time
on appeal, the courts signal the importance of a personal,
reasonable expectation of privacy and acknowledge the value
in limiting the exclusion of relevant, incriminating evidence.
The circuits value standing as a method to limit the
availability of the exclusionary rule and curtail the number
of people who may seek the remedy in court. To do so, the
circuits seemingly disregard Rakas and treat Fourth
Amendment standing more like Article III standing. As a
result, a defendant at any time could face a challenge to
standing even if the evidence was first suppressed at the
district court. This likely reflects the circuits’ desire to
protect the community, permit law enforcement the space to
operate effectively, and advance an atomistic view of the
Fourth Amendment. But even a district court in the Eighth
Circuit questions this approach and its failure to recognize
the law as written in Rakas and Steagald. The First and
Eighth Circuits find the language in Steagald permissive of
waiver, rather than demanding an initial challenge at the
district court.
Finally, the approaches of the Sixth and Ninth
circuits seek to find the balance between the exclusionary
rule and standing by permitting the government to challenge
standing for the first time on appeal in some cases. This
approach is first appealing because it seeks to strike a
balance between two competing but important points of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
The Sixth Circuit
approach seems to value the exclusionary rule’s role for
protecting the right to be free from illegal searches and
seizures, while also acknowledging situations that may have
a “plain” indication that the defendant lacked a reasonable
expectation of privacy. In other words, it appears the Sixth
Circuit values the constitutional protection the exclusionary
rule affords. Exclusion discourages police misconduct and
encourages judicial integrity. But the Sixth Circuit also
anticipates a need in some “difficult cases” that would
question the integrity of the judiciary should the evidence be
excluded, and a criminal permitted to go free—to limit the
availability of the exclusionary rule. It affords, however,
discretion to the Sixth Circuit to determine when the record
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is “plain” and what the difficult cases might be that would
permit the government to challenge standing for the first
time on appeal. These cases are likely those that would
offend the public’s sense of fairness—excluding evidence in a
case with public attention, etc.
While each approach reflects the circuit’s own value
of both the exclusionary rule and standing, and whether the
protection of the Fourth Amendment should be limited, there
should be a unified approach. The Supreme Court should
examine the approaches and seek to strike an appropriate
balance for uniformity.

C. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD CLARIFY STEAGALD’S
PERMISSIVE LANGUAGE IN FAVOR OF DEFINITIVE
LANGUAGE ACKNOWLEDGING WAIVER ON APPEAL.
The Supreme Court should abandon the permissive language
in Steagald to resolve the circuit split over standing and
waiver. The permissive language permits the Eighth Circuit
to ignore the possibility of waiver. The approach should
disallow the government to challenge standing for the first
time on appeal. This approach would acknowledge the
importance of the exclusionary rule in enforcing Fourth
Amendment rights, deter prosecutorial mistake and
misconduct by stealthily encroaching on the rights of the
citizens, and represents the outcome most expected in court
proceedings.
First, in solving the tension between the atomistic and
regulatory approaches to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
courts that permit waiver to standing challenges are not
disallowing all challenges to standing. They are simply
acknowledging that the appropriate place to argue the
atomistic or individual nature of the Fourth Amendment is
at the district court level. Requiring this argument to occur
at the district court level ensures that the remedy is only
sought by persons who had an invasion of a personal,
reasonable expectation of privacy.
This permits the
individual view of the Fourth Amendment as a personal right
to persist. When the matter reaches an appeals court, the
appropriate view is regulatory—a protection of the collective.
The government should litigate atomistic perspectives on the
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Fourth Amendment at the district court level—and a failure
to do so should result in a waiver.
What is more, disallowing a challenge to standing for the
first time on appeal would acknowledge that the
exclusionary rule is the best way to enforce the Fourth
Amendment. The Supreme Court already relies heavily on
this factual justification of the exclusionary rule. And while
excluding relevant, incriminating evidence does free some
individuals who committed crimes, the alternatives to
discourage illegal searches and seizures are inadequate to
protect the right of the citizens. The Court already finds the
social costs typically outweigh the public policy benefit when
it argues the exclusionary rule is the best remedy for a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. When an appellate
court permits the government to challenge standing on
appeal, it encroaches on this factual function of the
exclusionary rule. It places more power in standing than
perhaps the Supreme Court intended when it developed the
doctrine in Jones and Rakas.
Moreover, this approach would acknowledge the
value of the exclusionary rule in providing guidance for
procedure—another factual function. The exclusionary rule
provides bright-line rules for law enforcement investigating
criminal activity. It provides bright-line rules for what is
and is not permissible in a search or seizure. Similarly,
preventing a government challenge to standing for the first
time on appeal would tell prosecutors in the early stages of a
case what is and is not permissible as well. While the social
cost of permitting exclusion of relevant, incriminating
evidence exists, the factual justification encourages
regulation of the profession. A prosecutor should examine
the case and respond to a motion to suppress in a way that
addresses the admissibility of the evidence, including
whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the place or thing searched. Though Rakas tells
us this is not a preliminary inquiry, it should be part of the
inquiry conducted by the prosecutor responding to the
motion to suppress. When a prosecutor fails to address the
subject of standing at the district court level, the
unavailability of the argument on appeal may result in
relevant, incriminating evidence remaining excluded from
consideration. The Noble court admonished the work of the
prosecutors in the case—pointing out that the defendants
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who joined the motion to suppress clearly lacked standing
based on well-settled law from both the Sixth Circuit and the
Supreme Court. A policy of waiver provides prosecutors, like
law enforcement, bright-line guidance on how to proceed in
questions involving searches and motions to suppress the
fruits of these searches. Disallowing challenges to standing
on appeal could “compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way -- by removing
the incentive to disregard it.”268
Disallowing waiver also acknowledges the normative
justification for the exclusionary rule. In Boyd, the first case
to address Fourth Amendment rights, the Supreme Court
reminded other judicial officers of the duty “. . . to be watchful
for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any
stealthy encroachments thereon.”269 This directive rings
true in the 21st Century as well.
Simply put, permitting standing challenges on appeal
is a stealthy encroachment on constitutional rights. A
defendant and trier of fact have relied on a determination in
the initial motion to suppress. The approaches of the First,
Eighth, Sixth, and Ninth circuit, though different, all permit
the government to challenge standing for the first time on
appeal in some cases. Challenges on appeal permit the
government to, in those cases, make the “best” argument at
the district court (say, there existed an exception to the
warrant requirement such as an exigent circumstance or
consent) and then, if unsuccessful, they may challenge
standing on appeal. This is an inappropriate advantage. It
is a benefit unavailable to defendants. When the argument
is “forgotten” at the district court level, the government
should not be permitted to challenge standing on appeal.
The issue should be considered waived, fully, and courts
should not engage in allowing the argument to preserve
judicial integrity. Much like the argument in Mapp that a
court should not engage in activity that promotes including
evidence obtained illegally, a court should not engage in
activity that permits the government to bring an argument
for the first time on appeal after exhausting other arguments
at the district court level. Such conduct appears as unjust to
the outside eye as including evidence obtained illegally.
268
269

Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656.
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635.
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Prosecutors, too, should be discouraged from engaging in
behavior that questions the integrity of the judicial system.
More support for this approach is rooted in traditional
legal tenants. Circuits who permit waiver acknowledge this
fact. In most legal proceedings at the district court level, a
failure to address an element of a claim or defense renders
the element or defense waived. The same should be true for
standing. While Rakas instructs that standing is not a
preliminary inquiry, it is a part of the substantive claim of
the Fourth Amendment. If a defendant must prove standing
as part of a Fourth Amendment claim in a motion to
suppress, the government’s failure to challenge standing in
a response to the motion should be considered a waiver of the
issue.

V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Supreme Court should clarify the
permissive language in Steagald and encourage a unified
approach to the question of standing and waiver on appeal.
Disallowing an initial challenge to standing on appeal would
strike the appropriate balance between the exclusionary rule
and standing, guard against encroachment on Fourth
Amendment rights, and promote judicial integrity. Most
other elements and defenses not claimed in district court are
waived. This approach would ensure standing is given its
proper prominence without excessive power. With a unified
approach barring an initial challenge on appeal, prosecutors
would have a bright-line rule for approaching standing,
much like law enforcement officers have bright-line rules for
searching persons and places. Disallowing a standing
challenge for the first time on appeal adopts the approach of
most circuits and provides clarity in an uncertain area of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

